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RECENT DECISIONS

ABSTRACTS

Mary Jane Plumer*
CoNFLICT oF LAws-APPLICATION oF STATE STATUTE oF LIMITATIONS
IN DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP CASE IN FEDERAL COURT-EXTENSION OF
ERIE RAILROAD v. ToMPKINs-The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
principal case to decide upon "the extent to which federal courts, in the exercise
of the authority conferred upon them by Congress to administer equitable reme-

* Managing Editor, ~ICH, L. REV,
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dies, are bound to follow state statutes and decisions affecting those remedies." 1
Grace York instituted as a class suit an action based upon an alleged breach of
trust on the part of petitioner, Guaranty Trust Company, and invoked the
jurisdiction of the federal district court on the ground of diversity of citizenship.
It was argued that a statute of limitations of New York, the state in which the
cause of action, if any, arose, barred the action. The district court gave summary judgment for petitioner and the circuit court reversed, 2 holding that, for
the purposes of the Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins doctrine, state statutes
of limitations are to be regarded in the federal courts as affecting not substantive
rights but merely equitable "remedial rights." Held, reversed and remanded.
The rule that the federal court will apply state law to matters of "substance,"
applies to suits in equity as well as to suits at law. The court the)l ruled that
the statute of limitations was a matter of "substance" saying, " ... the question
is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of procedure in some
sense ..The question is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner and
the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced,
or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect that
.alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result
of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be
controlling in an action ••• in a State court?" 3 Guaranty Trust Company v.

York, (U.S. 1945).4
CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw-CoNsENT OF STA.;E TO SuIT-AcTION BROUGHT
FEDERAL COURT TO RECOVER STATE TAXES-Petitioner, a non-resident
foreign manufacturing corporation, brought an action in a federal district court
against the Department of the Treasury of Indiana and officers, who together
constituted the board of the department, to recover gross income taxes which
petitioner alleged had been illegally exacted. The action was brought in accordance with an Indiana statute,1 prescribing the procedure for obtaining refund of
taxes, which provided that a t;xpayer must first file a timely application for
a refund with the state department of the treasury, and, upon denial, could then
recover in an action against the "department." The statute further provided
IN

1

The court quoted from Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 at 294, 60 S. Ct. 527

(1940).

,

2

(C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 503.
3 Principal case at I I (United States Supreme Court advance sheet, June

1945).

I 8,

Justice Rutledge wrote a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Justice Murphy, in •
which he expressed the view that the cause should be remanded to the circuit court
for a determination of the question whether the cause of action was barred. Unless
that question were decided in the affirmative, the question decided by the majority
would not come up. But if the question considered by the majority did come up,
precedent demanded that it be decided the other way.
4 For case note on circuit court of appeals decision see 44 CoL. L. REv. 915
(1944). See also collection of material in 43 MrcH. L. REv. 761 at 771, item 30;
and 115 A.L.R. 1007 (1938).
1

lnd. Stat. (Burns, 1943 Replacement), § 64-2614(a).
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that any judgment obtained in such an action should be satisfied "out of any
fu'h.ds in the state treasury." 2 The district court denied recovery and the circuit
court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court took the case on certiorari and
defendant, for the first time, raised the defense that it was, under the I Ith
Amendment, immune from suit in the federal courts without its consent. Held>
judgment vacated and cause remanded with direction to dismiss the complaint.
The statute under which the action was brought authorized an action against
the state officer in his official capacity and therefore the action was against the
state. The legislature did not waive the state's immunity by enacting the statute.
The statute provided that "the circuit or. superior court of the county in which
the taxpayer ... is located shall have original jurisdiction . ~ .." There is no
clear indication here that the state intended to consent to suits in the federal
courts, and "when we are dealing with the sovereign exemption from judicial
interference in the vital field of financial administration a clear declaration of
the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its
own creation must be found." 3 Neither can it be said that the state attorney
general waived immunity, though he appeared and defended the suit in the
district and circuit courts. The Indiana Constitution provides that no special
act shall be passed authorizing a suit against the state. The court said that
"Since the state legislature may waive state immunity only by general law, it
is not to be presumed, in the absence of clear language to the contrary, that they
conferred on administrative or executive officers discretionary power to grant or _
withhold consent in individual cases." 4 Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treas. of
Ind., (U.S. 1945) 65 S. Ct. 347.5
CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT-MEssAGEs NoT
GooDs "PRODUCED" FOR SHIPMENT IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE-On writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court, petitioner telegraph company sought reversal of an order enjoining it from using messengers under sixteen and motor
car drivers between the ages of sixteen and eighteen in the transmission of messages, in violation of section 12(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.1 The act
provides that "no producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall ship or deliver for
shipment in commerce any goods produced ... in or about which .•. any oppressive child labor has been employed." 2 Petitioner contended that telegraph
messages were not "goods" which the company "produced" and "shipped" in
inter-state commerce, within the meaning of the act. Held, judgment reversed.
Although telegraph messages can be said to be "subjects of commerce" and,
therefore, "goods," they cannot be said to be "produced" within the meaning
of the act, since "handled" and "worked on" ( the terms used in the act to
Id. § 64-2614(b).
The Court quoted (at p. 351) from United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 at
501, 60 S. Ct. 659 (1940).
4
Principal case at 352.
5
See item 113, 43 M1cH. L. REv. 763 at 788 (1945).
2

3

1
2

29 U.S.C. (1940), § 212(a).
29 U.S.C. (1940), § 212(a).
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define "produced" 3 ) , do not include h~ndling in carriage or transmission. The
court held further that messages were not "shipped" within the meaning ·of
the act. 4 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, (U.S. 1944) 65 S. Ct.

335.

5

CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY OF STOCK TO EXECUTION UNDER UNIFORM
STOCK TRANSFER AcT WHERE STOCK CERTIFICATE Is OUTSIDE GEoGRAPHICAL JURISDICTION OF COURT-Plaintiff was ordered by the Multnomah County, Oregon, court to surrender to the sheriff of that ·county stock
certificates owned by plaintiff and at that time kept in a safety deposit box in
Vancouver, Washington; the certificates to be sold and the proceeds used to
pay a judgment rendered by the same court against plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed
on the ground that under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the certificate was
personal property, not merely an evidence of ownership of stock; its situs was
in Washington and not subject to execution in Oregon. Held, affirmed. Under
the Uniform Act an attachment or levy on stock may be made effective by
enjoining the holder from transferring the certificate/ and by the sheriff leaving a copy of the writ of attachment with the proper officers of the corporation.2
Both the debtor and the corporations in which he owned stock were in Oregon,
but according to section I 3 of the Uniform Act,8 no new certificate could be
issued unless the old one had been lost or destroyed. However, section 14 provides that a creditor whose debtor is the owner of the certificate is entitled to
"such aid from the courts of appropriate jurisdiction by injunction or otherwise,
in attaching the certificate or satisfying the claim by means thereof as is allowed
at law or in equity, in regard to property which cannot readily be attached or
levied upon by ordinary legal process." 4 Under this section, the action of the
court was proper.• Hodes v. Hodes, (Ore. 1945) 155 P.(2d) 564.5
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REVERSAL OF STATE COURT
CONVICTION ON GROUND OF WANT OF DuE PROCEss-At the trial at which
one Malinski was convicted of murder, evidence was admitted of certain confessions made by Malinski concerning his guilt. The evidence was that Malinski
had been held in a hotel room for four days .without arraignment. During the
first day he had not been permitted to see a lawyer and had been deprived of
his clothes for most of the day. There was some evidence that he had been
beaten but this was disputed. On the afternoon of the first day Malinski cons Fair Labor Standards Act of 193 8, § 3 I (j), 29 U.S.C. ( 1940), § 203 (j).
4
Justice Murphy filed a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Justices Black,
Douglas, and Rutledge.
·
5 For other cases construihg the F.L.S.A. see 43 MICH. L. REv. 761, item 2.
(1945). See also Radin, "A Case Study in Statutory Interpretation," 33 CAL. L. REv.
219 ( I 945) ; and see generally Davisson, "Th~ S!=ope of the Fair Labor Standards Acts,"
43 MICH. L. REv. 867 (1945); 29 lowA L. REv. 606 (1945).
Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 13, Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 78-113.
Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §§ 6-1501 and 7-206.
3
Id. § 78-113.
4
Id. § 78-114.
5
See 122 A.L.R. 338 at 366 et seq. (1939).
1

2
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fessed to the crime and on the second and third days he identified a car connected with the crime and the place of the crime, and early in the morning of
the fifth day he made a full confession. The first confession was not introduced
as evidence but was referred to at' the trial .as bearing upon the voluntary
character of the other confessions, which were admitted. The prosecutor alsomade reference in his summary to the jury to this first confession in such a way
as to indicate that it was involuntary. The question of the character of the
confessions admitted in evidence was submitted to the jury with the instruction
that if they were found to be the result of coercion, they were invalidated by
statute. No objection was made to the references to this first confession, or to
the instructions to the jury on this point. On appeal from the conviction, the
Court of Appeals of New York found that none of the confessions were, as a
matter of law, involuntary, and affirmed the conviction.1 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide the question of "due process" and heU, reversed.
The Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, said that "the question whether
there has been a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the introduction of an involuntary confession is one on which we must
make an independent determination on the undisputed facts .•.• If all the attendant circumstances indicate that the confession was coerced or compelled,·
it iµay not be used to convict a defendant." 2 The Court then examined the
evidence summarized above and came to the conclusion that the first confession
was coerced and that since the judgment then rested in part upon a confession
obtained by coercion, the case should be remandeq. 8 Malinski v. People of State
of New York, (U.S. 1945) 65 S. Ct. 781.

FEDERAL CouRTS-!NTERLOCUTORY REVIEW-DIRECT APPEAL To SuPREME COURT UNDER SECTION 262 OF JUDICIAL CODE-Petitioners, by certiorari, sought review in the Supreme Court of an order of the federal district
court denying petitioners' motion for dissolution of a preliminary injunction,
which had been issued against them in a suit brought by the United States under
the Anti-Trust laws. The preliminary injunction, prohibited petitioners, who
were foreign corporations, from disposing of any property in the U nite'd States
until the court should determine the issues of the case. HeU, an order granting a
preliminary injunction is reviewable under the statute authorizing the issuance
of writs not otherwise specifically provided for 1 where the order affects a matter
outside the issues of the case, and is beyond the power of the court issuing it, for
1

292 N.Y. 370, 55 N.E. (2d) 357 (1944).
Principal case at 783.
8
A concurring opinion was written by Justice Frankfurter; Chief-Justice Stone
and Justices Roberts, Reed, and Jackson dissented; Justices Murphy and Rutledge
dissented from the affirmance of the judgment against one Rudish, who was tried with
Malinski.
2

1

Judicial Code § 262, 28 U.S.C. (1940), § 377·
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otherwise it could never be corrected.2 De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v.
United States, (U.S. 1945) 65 S. Ct. 1130.3
FUTURE INTERESTS-MEANING OF."'NEXT NEAREST OF KIN"-Testator
provided in his will that his entire estate be divided equally among his four
children ( except for a bequest of $ 1000 to his daughter, Anne Lee Warren, in
addition to her share), the entire estate to be held in trust "for the benefit of
the heirs named ..•" until the youngest reaches the age of twenty-one years.
It was further provided that the bequests made to Aime Lee Warren were to
be held in trust "for the benefit. and use of Anne Lee Warren during her
natural life, and at her death without children her estate to descend to the next
nearest of kin." 1 This action was brought after the death without surviving
descendants of Anne Lee Warren by the successor trustee under the will for a
construction of the terms of the will. The claimants are Guy Warren, sole
surviving brother of Anne Lee W arre~, and Thomas Penner, grandson of a
deceased brother. Warren claimed the entire estate on the ground that since
he was a son of the testator, and Penner was orily a great-grandson, he was the
"next nearest of kin." Penner claimed that "next nearest" meant "second
nearest" and therefore he should inherit the entire estate. Held, affirming the
lower court on this point, the estate should be divided equally between the two
claimants. The court arrived at this conclusion by determining the intent of the
testator, as it appeared from a consideration of the will, to be that "next nearest
of kin" meant a class composed of those persons referred to as "heirs" ( as used
by testator to denote wife and children) or their descendants. St. Louis Union
Trust Co. v. Kaltenbach, (Mo. 1945) 186 S.W. '(2d) 578. 2
INJUNCTION-POWER OF COURT TO ENJOIN DISPOSAL OF ASSETS UNDER
ANTI-TRUST LAws-Petitioners, foreign corporations doing business in the
United States, were charged, in a complaint filed in the district court by the
United States, with conspiracy to restrain and monopolize the commerce of the
United States with foreign nations in gem and industrial diamonds in violation
of the anti-trust laws.1 The Court granted a motion filed by the United States
for a preliminary injunction restraining petitioners from withdrawing from the
United States any property located therein, and from disposing of such property
"until such time as the court shall have determined the issues of this case and
defendant corporations shall have complied with its orders." 2 The. district
2
Four members of the Court (Justices Douglas, Black, Murphy and Rutledge)
dissented. They thought that in providing in the Expediting Act that in suits in equity
under the Anti-Trust Act in which the United States is complainant, the appeal from
the final decree of the trial court should be direct, Congress indicated its intent to
except mere interlocutory decrees. There was nothing unusual about this interlocutory
decree, they said, which would take it out of this rule.
3 For a more complete statement of the facts of this case see below, INJUNCTION.
1

Quoted by court in principal case at p. 580. (Italics the court's.)
For construction of "next of kin" see 133 A.L.R. 597 at 601 (1941); 126
A.L.R. 157 at 169 (1940).
2

1

Sh.erman Anti-Trust Act, § 1, as amended, and §

2; Wilson Tariff Act,§ 73, 15 U.S.C. (1940), § 8.
2

Principal case at

I

13 2.

2,

15 U.S.C. (1940), §§ 1,
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court based its power upon section 4 of the Sherman Act 3 and section 262 of
the Judicial Code,4 reasoning that such a decree was necessary as the only means
of enforcing "any order or decree which the Court may render." Otherwise
petitioners might remove their assets and render sequestration of their property
impossible. On certiorari under section 262,6 held, reversed. Neither section 4
of the Sherman Act nor section 262 of the Judicial Code enlarge the general
equity powers of the Court. A preliminary injunction is appropriate to grant
intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be finally granted,
but there is no jurisdiction under the Sherman and Wilson Acts to enter a
money judgment. In fact, there is no precedent for such an injunction and to
create one would permit "every suitor who resorts to chancery for any sort of
relief by injunction ••. on a mere statement of belief that the defendant can
easily make away with or transport his money or goods, to impose an injunction,
indefinite in duration, disabling him to use so much of his funds or property as
the court deems necessary for security or compliance with a possible decree." 6
DeBeers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, (U.S. 1945) 65 S. Ct.
1130.
LABOR LAW-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT-AUTHORITY OF ADMINISTRATOR TO ABOLISH INDUSTRIAL HOMEWORK UNDER SECTION 8(f)-In

order to make effective a minimum wage order, based upon the recommendations of an industry committee for the embroideries industry, the Wage and
Hour Division Administrator ordered that "homework" in the industry be prohibited. At peak employment there were 8,500 to l 2,000 homeworkers in the industry while there were about 18,500 factory workers. The administrator relied for
his authority for the order upon section 8 ( f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
which provides that, "Orders issued under this section •.. shall contain such
terms and conditions as the administrator finds necessary to carry out the purposes of such orders, to prevent the circumvention or evasion thereof, and to
safeguard the minimum wage rates established therein." 1 In a proceeding to
review the order, the circuit court of appeals sustained it and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide the single question, whether, granting that
the prohibition was "necessary," i.e., absolutely essential to accomplish the
purposes of the order and of the statute, the administrator had authority to issue
it. Petitioner argued that the prohibition was not a "method of enforcement,"
but "a form of experimental social legislation" touching a matter not incidental
to the order and therefore beyond the administrator's power. They seem also
to have made other arguments that Congress did not intend to authorize such

,

8

That section reads, in part, " .•• and pending such petition [i.e. the petition by
which proceedings under the Act are begun] and before final decree, the court may
at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed
just in the premises." 15 U.S.C. (1940), § 4.
4
That section reads, in part, " •.. the district courts shall have power to issue all
writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise
of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."

28

u.s.c.

(1940), § 377.

5

Discussed at p. 169, supra.
6
Principal case at u35 .

1
.

29

u.s.c.

(1940), § 208 (f).
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an order, based upon the legislative history of the act, and upon the provisions
which seemed to indicate a contrary intent. Held, affirmed. The administrator
is authorized "to include 'such terms and conditions' as he finds necessary to
carry out the purposes of such orders." Nothing in the statute, or in the legislative history thereof, forbids him to take "the only measures which would be
effective, merely because other consequences necessarily would follow." 2 Justice
Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Chief Justice Stone, in
·which he; interpreted the section in question as authorizing the administrator to
facilitate enforcement only by such orders as pertain to keeping records or filing
reports. Gemsco, Inc. v. Wailing, (U.S: 1945) 65 S. Ct. 605.8
.

.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-RIGHT TO DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT UNDER.
MoRTGAGE WHERE NoTE SECURED BY IT Is BARRED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONs-Plainti;ff brought an action to recover a judgment for a deficiency
arising out of a mortgage foreclosure sale. The mortgage foreclosed was given
as security for a debt evidenced by promissory note's, but the mortgage itself
also contained a covenant to pay the debt. Defendant argued that since more
than six years elapsed between the time the notes were declared due and the
time that the action was brought, and since a six year statute of limitations is
provided with reference to "an· action upon a contract, obligation or liability,
express or implied," 1 the action was barred. Plaintiff contended that the applicable statute was the ten-year statute of limitations with reference to "an action
upon a contract contained in any conveyance or mortgage of or instrument
affecting the title to real property." 2 The trial court'dismissed the action and
plaintiff appealed. Held, reversed. "In this state a note and mortgage are separate contracts•••• They afford separate remedies.••• Neither [the six year
statute of limitations applying to the note, nor the ten year statute applying to
the contract contained in the mortgage] ••• extinguishes the debt. Each bars
the remedy to which it applies•••• Thus we are impelled to the conclusion that
a statute which bars the remedy on a note does not bar the right of the owner
of the debt to enforce the promise contained in the mortgage ••• " 8 Lincoln
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Kelly, (N.D. 1945) 17 N.W. 906. 4
TAXATION-TAX IMMUNITY OF FEDERAL HousING-The Federal Public Housing Authority sought an injunction against taxing officials of Cuyahoga
County, and the City of Cleveland to restrain them from attempting to assess
and collect taxes under Ohio law on lands in the city and county belonging to
the United States. The lands in question were condemned under the National
Recovery program for low-cost dwelling units, and the units, erected by the
Federal Public Housing Authority, were leased to Cleveland Metropolitan
2

Principal case at 613.
For an annotation on the problem involved see 155 A.L.R. 782 (1945), and
143 A.L.R. (1943).
· 1 N.D. Rev. Code (1943) § 28-on6 quoted by the court in principal case at
908.
2 N .D. Rev. Code ( I 943) § 28-0 II 5 quoted by the court in principal case at
908.
8
Principal case at 909-910.
4
See I 24 A.L.R. 640 ( 1940).
8
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Housing, a State of Ohio Authority. Appellant contended that the United
States Housing Act is unconstitutional because Congress has no power to establish low-cost housing projects. The lower court granted the injunction. The
-dissenting judge said that the government couldn't engage in private business
in such a way as to immunize the property employed from normal state taxation
to support local police and other services required of the community of which the
housing project forms a part. Held, affirmed. It was constitutional for Congress
to enact the Housing Act "to promote the general welfare of the nation," 1
and for it specifically to exempt the property held thereunder from state taxation.2 The court pointed out further that the act authorizes agreements with
the authority to pay annual sums, not exceedi~g taxes which would otherwise
be paid, in lieu of taxes.3 City of Cleveland v. United States, (U.S. 1945)
65 S. Ct. 280.
WILLS--FUTURE INTEREST&--EFFECT OF WILL CONTEST BY LEGATEE
FOR PROBABLE CAUSE WHERE LEGACY CONDITIONED UPON PROVISION
AGAINST WILL CONTEST-Decedent, after providing in, his will for specific
bequests to his two surviving brothers and two surviving sisters who would
have been his heirs, directed that if any person entitled to a legacy under the
will should directly or indirectly contest the will, "all legacies • • . declared in
favor of such person • • • shall immediately thereupon be revoked." 1 This
action was instituted by the administrator of decedent's will to ascertain whether
or not decedent's sister, Fanny Watkins, who had contested the will, and his
other sisters and brother who participated in the contest, had forfeited their
bequests. The trial court decided, following Moran v. Moran, 2 that the provision in the will was operative, but dismissed the action on the ground that the
administrator was not the proper person to bring it. Held, the executor was
the proper person to institute the proceedings, but, overruling Moran v. Moran,
the condition in the will "will not be enforced against one who contests the will
in good faith and for probable cause." 3 The reason given by the court for
overruling its earlier decision is that it is against public policy to give a man
the choice between contesting a will secured by fraud, or undue influence, or
one executed by an incompetent, or forged, and accepting his legacy. The fact
that the brother and sister found within the forfeiture clause by the lower court
had acted on the advice of counsel in contesting the will, the fact that the judge
who presided over the trial of the will contest was satisfied that a jury question
was presented, and the fact that the jury deliberated for 29 hours before returning for further instructions and then stayed out six more hours before returning a verdict, indicates that the contest was in good faith. The cause was remanded for entry of supplemental judgments in accord with the opinion. In re
Cocklin's Estate, (Iowa 1945) 17 N.W. (2d) 129.4
42 u.s.c. (1940), § 140~.
2 42 U.S.C. (1940), § 1405(e).
s 42 u.s.c. (1940), § 1413.
1 Principal case at 130.
2 744 Iowa 451, 123 N.W. 202 (1909).
3
Principal case at 135.
4
See 125 A.L.R. II35 (1940); 146 A.L.R. 12II (1943).
1

